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Introduction 
The European Union has had to deal with a series of crisis in the past, but currently, it faces 
an exceptional accumulation of tensions triggered by the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, 
Islamic terrorism, the imperial aspirations of Putin and Brexit ambitions. Does the 
politicization of European integration increase under these conditions? And who are the 
possible drivers of a process of politicization of European integration? In this contribution, I 
argue the politicization of European integration is not only time-dependent, but also 
embedded in national political conflict structures which vary systematically between three 
European regions – the Northwest, the South and the East of Europe. In order to understand 
the impact of contemporary crisis conditions on the politicization of European integration, I 
argue, we have to take into account, how these crisis conditions are linked to the underlying 
region-specific national conflict structures. Given these different national conflict structures, 
and given the different types of crises experienced by the populations of the three regions, the 
type of politicization of European integration is likely to be very different from one region to 
the other. 
As has been pointed out by Hooghe and Marks (2009), there is nothing inevitable about the 
politicization of European integration. It takes partisan entrepreneurs who are capable and 
willing to mobilize the latent structural potentials for Euroscepticism to become politically 
and electorally relevant. If an issue is not debated in public and is not articulated by political 
organizations, it can only be politicized to a limited extent (Hutter and Grande, 2014). 
                                                          
* The research on which this contribution is based has been supported by the ERC grant 338875 (POLCON). 
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Moreover, national politics are still the crucial arena for the politicization of European 
integration. As a result of the weakness of the partisan channel of representation at the 
European level, partisan entrepreneurs still focus on national politics and they will most 
likely continue to do so for quite some time to come.  
Within national party competition, it is the Eurosceptics who have turned out to be the main 
drivers of the politicization of European integration (Grande and Kriesi, 2016; Hooghe and 
Marks, 2009), given that the pro-Europeans have done everything to depoliticize the 
European integration process. The repertory of the pro-Europeans’ depoliticization strategies 
has been vast (see Schimmelfennig (2014), Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2013), de Wilde and 
Zürn (2012)), including techniques such as de-emphasizing the issue of European integration 
in national elections (as in the 2013 German elections), sidestepping treaty changes in order 
to avoid referendums (as in the case of the Fiscal Compact), delegation to so called ‘non-
majoritarian’, technocratic supranational institutions (as the ECB, the ECJ or the Commis-
sion), euro-compatible government formation (excluding the Eurosceptics from government 
coalitions), adopting incomplete contracts (agreements which either cover up conflicts by 
vague wording or defer them to later stages of the political process), and, most generally, 
integration by regulation (the EU as ‘regulatory state’, which protects the illusion of 
sovereignty of the Member States). Depoliticizing the integration process has served the pro-
Europeans well as long as they got away with it.  In this contribution I suggest that the 
Eurosceptics are likely to be increasingly successful in calling the bluff of the pro-Europeans, 
but that, depending on the part of Europe, they will be of a different ilk. 
I shall be painting with a very broad brush, disregarding details in order to draw attention to 
what I consider to be the broad picture. Given the patchy character of pertinent empirical 
results, there is necessarily a considerable element of speculation. My discussion is divided 
into five parts. First, I present the current state of politicization of European integration. Next, 
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I discuss the preconditions of politicization at the level of the Member States of the three 
regions – Northwestern (NWE), Southern (SE) and Central- and Eastern Europe (CEE). I first 
discuss the latent conflict structures that condition the region-specific party competition 
before I turn to the contemporary region-specific context conditions that are likely to 
precipitate the mobilization of these latent structures. Due to limitations of space, I only 
briefly touch on institutional conditions, which does not mean that they do not have an 
important role to play in the full account of the politicization of European integration. In the 
last two sections, I draw the broader implications of the politicization of European integration 
and conclude.  
 
The current state of politicization of European integration 
According to Grande and Hutter (2016, p. 7), ‘politicization can be defined as an expansion 
of the scope of conflict within the political system.’ In the literature, a consensus is emerging 
regarding the components of what we mean by the term of ‘politicization’ (de Wilde et al 
2016, p. 4). According to this consensus, we should distinguish between three conceptual 
dimensions of politicization: issue salience (visibility), actor expansion (range) and actor 
polarization (intensity and direction). Fully politicized issues are politicized in all three 
dimensions.  
The politicization of European integration has been characterized by ‘a patchwork of 
politicizing moments’ rather than a uniform trend towards ever more politicization (Hutter et 
al., 2016). Thus, in his study of the public debates on European integration in six NWE 
countries (Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK) during the 
early 2000s, Höglinger (2016) found that the public debate on European integration 
intensifies during extraordinary, but predictable institutional and policy-related events at the 
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European level (such as European summits) and the national level (such as national 
referendums on the issue). These events are initiated and scheduled by either the EU or 
national governments and public authorities who have largely succeeded so far in keeping 
them under control. Höglinger concludes that politicization of European integration remained 
limited, given the conflict-tempering effect of the multi-layered system of representation in 
the EU.  
Hutter et al. (2016) have also analyzed the politicization of European integration in NWE, but 
over a longer period of time (1970s up to 2012), based on three ‘windows of observation’: 
public debates on integration steps, national election campaigns and Europeanized protest 
events. Overall, this broader study confirms that there is ‘something like politicization’ 
(Schmitter 2009, p. 211), but politicization has been neither systematically increasing over 
time, nor has it been sustained at a certain elevated level, which serves to disconfirm de 
Wilde and Zürn’s (2012) ‘authority transfer’ hypothesis. Politicization is certainly not a post-
Maastricht phenomenon as some have maintained (see Hooghe and Marks 2009; de Wilde 
and Zürn 2012), but has been flaring up and temporarily reaching impressive levels at 
specific moments in time before and after Maastricht. Moreover, politicization has been 
rather moderate. There has been virtually no mobilization in the streets. In the protest arena, 
not only has the level of politicization been consistently low, it even declined in the 2000s. 
Grande and Kriesi (2016) use the term ‘punctuated politicization’ to characterize the overall 
pattern of politicization, but maybe ‘intermittent politicization’ would be a more appropriate 
term.  
Confirming Höglinger’s results, Hutter et al. (2016) find that it is ‘integration steps’ which 
constitute the perfect occasions for the politicization of the European integration process. 
Unlike national elections they directly focus attention on specific aspects of European 
integration – either transfers of authority and changes in the institutional framework of the 
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EU or the admission of new Member States. The so-called Northern enlargement in the early 
1970s, the Maastricht Treaty, the failed Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty stand out 
as cases with particularly intense public debates, as do the accession debates in Austria, 
Sweden and Switzerland (the accession to the EES and the Bilateral Treaties). National 
referendums serve as catalysts of politicization in such debates, because they are not easily 
controlled by the authorities. Referendums provide dissenting voices with a public forum 
they usually lack. The risks of referendums for the public authorities are especially large in 
countries (such as the Netherlands or France) where the authorities do not have much 
experience with such institutions. 
To the institutionalized integration steps, we should add the European crises, which equally 
constitute exceptional moments of politicization. The euro crisis certainly is a case in point. 
However, as Kriesi and Grande (2016) show, the results are mixed with respect to the overall 
politicization of the debate about the euro crisis: on the one hand, this debate has been 
exceptionally salient and has contributed to the increased visibility of Europe in the politics 
of the Member States. On the other hand, the euro crisis debate was confined to national and 
supranational executive actors and has not accelerated the transfer of European politics into 
‘mass politics’, at least not in the six NWE countries (Austria, France, Germany, Sweden, 
Switzerland and UK) in question. Rather, it has mainly taken place in the intergovernmental 
channel and has been dominated by supranational executive agencies and national 
governments. This is why it did not trigger an unprecedented level of politicization of 
European integration.  
With respect to national elections, Hutter et al. (2016) find an overall increase of 
politicization of the European integration process over the last four decades, but the most 
important result in this respect is the large variation from one country to the other. There is no 
uniform politicization process in the electoral arena developing at more or less the same time 
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and with similar intensity across all countries. Instead, conflicts over the country’s own EU 
membership, which occurred at different moments in time, spilled over into the electoral 
arena and led to an intense politicization of the integration process. Such conflicts have been 
especially intense in Britain and Switzerland. Membership conflicts concerning the accession 
of third countries also spilled over into national elections, as is exemplified by the conflicts 
over Turkey’s EU membership in Austrian, German and French elections. The country-
specific differences found by this study are, however, limited by the fact that they are all 
located in NWE.  
To appreciate the full range of country-specific variations with respect to the role of 
European integration in national elections, we should, of course, take into account the 
experience of countries from all parts of Europe. For this purpose, we can rely on Haughton’s 
(2014) overview over the impact of the EU on roughly 60 national parliamentary elections in 
EU Member States during the period from May 2004 to December 2012. Reducing his 
ordinal impact measure to a dichotomy of ‘low’ and ‘medium-high’ impact, we observe that 
the bulk of these elections fall into the ‘low’ category (82 percent). However, there are 
significant differences between the three regions: while the EU has a ‘medium-high’ impact 
in only 8 and 14 percent of the elections respectively in CEE and NWE countries, the 
corresponding share is as high as 40 percent in SE. Moreover, it is striking that all the 
elections with a medium-high impact fall into the more recent ‘crisis’ period, not only in the 
South, but also in the other two parts of Europe. In SE, three Greek elections (2009, 
2012I+II), as well as the Portuguese (2011), Spanish (2011) and Cypriot (2011) crisis 
elections are characterized by a considerable EU impact. Outside of the South, there are three 
recent high impact elections in NWE (Finland 2011, Ireland 2011, and the Netherlands 2012), 
and two in CEE (Bulgaria 2009, Lithuania 2012).  
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European elections have been famously said to be secondary elections and mainly about 
domestic issues. In his analysis of the 1994 and 2004 European elections in Austria, France, 
Germany and the UK, Dolezal (2012) found, however, that the salience of European issues 
increased from 1994 to 2004, reaching more than 50 percent of all the issues debated in the 
EP election campaigns in three out of the four countries (Germany being the exception). 
However, the bulk of these European issues were related to constitutional matters, i.e. to 
issues for which the EP has only a limited role to play. Moreover, as Dolezal also documents, 
these issues mainly set the Eurosceptics against the mainstream parties 
The most recent European elections have further substantiated these earlier results. While the 
‘Spitzenkandidaten’ largely went unnoticed (Hobolt, 2015, p. 10), the context of the 
Eurozone crisis changed the European quality of these elections and turned them into ‘the 
most “European” electoral contests to date’ (Hobolt, 2015, p. 19). The clearest indication that 
voters were more concerned about European issues was the surge in popularity for political 
parties that proposed radical reform of, or even exit from, the EU. What is most striking from 
Hobolt’s results is that protest vote factors were secondary, while ideological factors (i.e. 
factors linked to Euroscepticism) dominated the vote and that the impact of these factors 
varied across European regions. It was in Western Europe (she does not distinguish between 
North and South) that the ideological factors were particularly important, while in CEE the 
explanatory power of all of the variables she considered turned out to be quite weak. What 
distinguishes the South from the North in Western Europe is the type of Eurosceptic party 
that proved to be successful. Table 1 presents the vote shares of left and right Eurosceptic 
parties from the three regions in the 2014 EP elections. As we can easily see, it is the 
Eurosceptics from the right who dominated in NWE, while the Eurosceptics from the left 
dominated in SE. In the CEE countries, the Eurosceptics from the right were also more 
important than those from the left – especially in Poland and in Hungary. The table presents 
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two sets of figures – one from Hobolt (2014) and one from Hernandez and Kriesi (2016). The 
latter figures differ from the former to the extent that they include only strongly Eurosceptic 
parties. Restricting Euroscepticism to the hard core leads to the conclusion that, with the 
exception of Hungary and Poland, Eurosceptics hardly played any role at all in CEE 
countries. 
 <Table 1> 
These results provide strong confirmation for the point stressed by de Wilde et al. (2016) that 
politicization of European integration has not only been varying over time, but that it has also 
been highly differentiated across countries. In order to understand this differentiation in 
space, I suggest, we need to take into account the development of national conflict structures 
into which the politicization of European integration is embedded. Doing so requires that we 
take a longer-term perspective. 
 
The national political conflict structures 
In his Reflections on the revolution in Europe, Dahrendorf (1990, pp. 79-93) distinguished 
between three speeds of the political transition to democracy – the hour of the lawyer, the 
hour of the politicians and the hour of the citizens. He suggested that the hour of the lawyer, 
i.e. the formal process of constitutional reform, takes at least six months. After the 
establishment of the constitution normal politics takes over and sets in motion political and 
economic reforms. This is the hour of the politicians, which takes at least six years before a 
general sense that things are moving up is likely to spread. The third speed refers to the 
citizens, i.e. to ‘the social foundations which transform the constitution and the economy 
from fair-weather into all-weather institutions which can withstand the storms generated 
within and without, and sixty years are barely enough to lay these foundations’ (p. 93). I 
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think, Dahrendorf’s three hours are applicable not just to the democratization of CEE, but to 
processes of political development more generally. In other words, to understand the 
politicization of European integration, we need to keep in mind the important transformations 
of the social foundations that have been giving rise to the national conflict structures in the 
different parts of Europe over the last sixty years. While acknowledging that the national 
conflict structures differ from one country to the other, I suggest it still makes sense to reduce 
the complexity by insisting on the respective differences between three large European 
regions: the Northwest, the South and the East.  
In NWE, two social transformations have been highly consequential for political conflict: a 
first set of structural transformations that were endogenous to the NWE nation-states – 
processes of increasing affluence, secularization, deindustrialization, tertiarization, expansion 
of tertiary education, feminization of the work force and occupational upgrading – together 
attenuated traditional cleavages of religion and class and brought about a value change – a 
‘silent revolution’ (Inglehart, 1990). This change was driven by the expanding new middle 
class, or, more precisely, by the socio-cultural segment of the new middle class that 
articulated its demands in the so called ‘new social movements’ (e.g. Kriesi, 1989). These 
new social movements – environmental, peace, solidarity, squatters’, women’s and ‘rights’ 
movements’ of different kinds – stood at the origin of the rise of the New Left, of ‘new 
politics’, of the Green parties and of the transformation of the West European social-demo-
cratic parties which, in the process, have become middle-class parties in almost all countries 
of NWE (Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015, Häusermann, 2015).  
Second, structural transformations that were exogenous to the West-European nation-states – 
processes of ‘globalization’, ‘denationalization’ (Zürn, 2001), of opening up national borders 
in economic, political and cultural terms (Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012) – have brought about an 
increasing awareness of the fragility of the sovereignty of the nation-state and of national 
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culture more generally. European integration has been part and parcel of this 
‘denationalization’ process (Kriesi, 2009, p. 222), but this process cannot be reduced to Euro-
pean integration. In addition, immigration from culturally ever more distant shores has been 
another important element of this overall process. Economic pressure on certain segments of 
the workforce (especially low-skilled workers) who have become doubly squeezed by 
competition from abroad (in the form of offshoring of their jobs) and at home (in the form of 
competition from immigrants) (Dancygier and Walter, 2015) is also part of this process. As 
we have argued (Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012), these processes created a heterogeneous set of 
‘globalization losers’ who have been mobilized mainly by the radical populist right (or the 
New Right), which, in the process, has become the party of the working class in many West 
European countries (Oesch, 2013). Some of the parties of the New Right have been newly 
emerging (such as the French Front National,  the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), or the 
Sweden Democrats (SD)), while others (such as the Austrian FPÖ, the Swiss SVP, or the 
True Finns) are actually transformed (liberal-) conservative mainstream parties that have 
existed already for a long time. 
From the point of view of the politicization of European integration, it is crucial that these 
social transformations and the double wave of political mobilization they gave rise to have 
been much weaker in the other two regions of Europe. In SE, Greece, Portugal and Spain 
remained under authoritarian regimes until the mid-seventies and the cultural revolution of 
the late sixties/early seventies simply did not take place. Accordingly, the mobilization by 
new social movements was comparatively weak or non-existent in SE1, and there was no 
New Left at the time. When these countries emerged from their authoritarian regimes, 
traditional cleavages of religion, class, and region still prevailed and prevented the 
establishment of a New Left or a New Right comparable to that in NWE. To a certain extent, 
                                                          
1 There are comparative data for Spain in the 1980s, which show the weakness of these movements (Koopmans, 
1996, pp, 38-40). 
12 
 
the same applies to Italy, even if the cultural revolution of the late sixties had left a stronger 
imprint on this country. Across SE, class cleavages in particular remained stronger than in the 
NWE because of the divided left and the competition between its two components – the 
(more radical) Communists and the (more moderate) Socialists –, which left little room for 
the autonomous mobilization by the new social movements. The New Left developed in the 
shadow of the ‘old left’ and remained weak. Accordingly, Green parties have been equally 
weak in SE and the socialists have assumed less of the characteristics of the New Left than 
they did in NWE.  
Not just the class cleavage, but also the religious cleavage remained comparatively strong and 
aligned with the class antagonism: a secular and rather radical left opposed a conservative 
and religious right. Moreover, the Centre-Periphery cleavage also kept political importance – 
at least in Spain and Italy, where strong regionalist movements continued to mobilize in 
Catalonia and the Basque country, as well as in Northern Italy. Given the legacy of 
authoritarian/fascist regimes, and given the fact that they have mainly been emigration 
countries, the radical populist right also remained weak or non-existent in SE. Where it did 
develop, as the Lega Nord in Italy, it was linked to the regionalist cause. Moreover, 
Euroscepticism, to the extent that it existed at all, was mainly located on the old Communist 
left (Verney, 2011). 
In CEE, it is less the impact of traditional cleavages than the absence of clear-cut cleavages 
that has characterized the political conflict structure. It has been argued that the Communist 
inheritance left a fragmented society and an unstructured pattern of political conflict. This 
thesis has been contradicted by subsequent empirical analyses, which showed that CEE 
countries were characterized by social cleavages of ethnicity (especially in the Baltic 
countries), religion (especially in Poland), region, class as well as age and education (Evans, 
2006). But the multiplication of conflicts does not yet make for a clear-cut cleavage structure. 
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Indeed, as Casal Bertoa (2015) has argued, cross-cutting cleavages constrain party system 
institutionalization, too. If measured against the four criteria of institutionalization that have 
been introduced by Mainwaring and Scully (1995), the party systems in CEE still appear to 
be poorly institutionalized. They have not (yet) developed stable roots in society2, the concept 
of cleavages structuring the party system hardly applies to them; they are hardly considered 
legitimate by the citizens of their countries, their organizations tend to be unstable and they 
are characterized by an extraordinarily high level of volatility (Powell and Tucker, 2013).    
Coman’s (2015) recent study suggests that the main dimension of conflict in CEE countries 
is, indeed, strongly connected to cultural issues. However, given the absence of the cultural 
revolution of the late sixties/early seventies in these countries, and given the absence of 
immigration and the generally low salience of European integration after accession 
(Haughton, 2014), these are not the cultural issues that have come to structure the party 
systems in NWE. The common denominator of the cultural issues mobilizing the 
conservative side of the CEE electorates seems to be rather a defensive nationalism asserting 
itself against internal enemies (such as ethnic minorities, Roma, and Jews) and external ones 
(such as foreign corporations colonizing the national economy). This defensive nationalism is 
fueled by the existence of contested national borders (e.g. national diasporas in neighbouring 
countries), by the unassimilated legacy of World War II and the Communist regimes, and by 
‘more deep-seated vulnerabilities’ (Haughton, 2014, p. 80). Given the lack of institutionali-
zation of the party systems, parties in CEE countries have a greater latitude in the 
mobilization of structural conflicts (see Sitter, 2002), and the strategies of the parties on the 
right prove to be decisive for the mobilization of this defensive nationalism, as is exemplified 
                                                          
2 ‘…the magnetic affinity between parties, voters, and social groups that existed in the West during the Golden 
Era of parties never formed in CEE, certainly not to the same degree’ (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012: 
157). [My general rule of thumb is if something is only important enough for a footnote it should be one of the 
first things to be trimmed. Perhaps just put the reference to Rohrschneider and Whitefield’s book in the text and 
cut the text of the footnote]  
14 
 
by the Orbán’s Fidesz in Hungary (Enyedi, 2005) and Kacziński’s Law and Justice (PiS) in 
Poland.  
 
 
The contemporary European context conditions: The assessment of the economic and 
political crises  
 
The accumulation of crises in the contemporary European context is likely to precipitate the 
mobilization of the latent political potentials which I have sketched in the previous section. In 
this respect, it is important to distinguish between two types of crisis – an economic crisis and 
a political crisis of representation. I would like to show that the three regions of Europe are 
quite distinct with respect to their experience of these two types of crises. This demonstration 
is based on very simple aggregate indicators. For the economic crisis, I use an attitudinal 
indicator that refers to the individuals’ assessment of the current situation of their national 
economy. Figure 1 presents the development of this indicator (i.e. the share of people who 
consider the situation as rather/very good) over time for the three regions of Europe. The 
vertical line in the figure indicates the beginning of the Great Recession in autumn 2008.  
 <Figure 1> 
Three points become quite apparent from this figure: first, people’s assessments of the state 
of the economy are generally much more optimistic in NWE than in the other two regions, 
where they have been equally pessimistic all along. It is well known that SE and CEE have 
been hit much harder by the Great Recession than NWE, but we may have been less aware of 
the considerable economic pessimism that prevailed in the former regions already some time 
before the onset of the Great Recession. Second, in all three regions, the positive assessments 
peaked in spring 2007, before the collapse of Lehman Brothers. In fall 2008, they dropped 
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precipitously to much lower levels across the board3. Third, while the assessments in NWE 
began to recover already in late 2009, great pessimism continued to characterize the overall 
economic sentiment in the other two regions. Only more recently, the assessments also 
picked up a little bit in CEE countries. Note, however, that even in NWE, the overall 
sentiments have not reached the levels of optimism that were characteristic for this region 
before the crisis.  
For the general political context conditions, I rely on two aggregate attitudinal indicators. The 
first one refers to the overall assessment of the quality of democracy at the national level 
based on the widely used question ‘How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in 
your country?’ Despite its wide use among political scientists, this indicator is not 
uncontroversial, but for the assessment of the quality of liberal democracy in particular it 
provides a relatively reliable measure (Ferrin, 2016). The second indicator measures trust in 
the European Parliament as a proxy for the general assessment of support of the EU. Figure 2 
presents the development of these two indicators over time for the three regions of Europe. 
The vertical lines in the two subgraphs of this figure again indicate the beginning of the Great 
Recession in fall 2008. 
 <Figure 2> 
The first part of Figure 2 documents the dramatic regional differences with regard to the 
development of assessments of the quality of democracy at the domestic level: in NWE, large 
majorities of the citizens have been fairly/very satisfied with the way democracy works in 
their country ever since the 1990s. The economic crisis has not changed the overall 
satisfaction in these countries. Democratic satisfaction has remained at the high level it had 
reached by the time of the fall of Lehman Brothers. By contrast, the level of satisfaction has 
                                                          
3 Note that there are, unfortunately no figures for spring 2008, which enhances the impression that the 
precipitous decline already set in before fall 2008. Given the much higher pre-crisis level in NWE, the drop was 
especially spectacular in NWE. 
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been much lower in the CEE countries ever since the early 1990s, hovering around one third 
of the citizens. The Great Recession did not change much in this respect in these countries 
either. There is widespread dissatisfaction of the CEE publics with the way their politics 
work and a deep-seated disenchantment of citizens with democratic politics. Finally, SE 
presents a third pattern, which is distinct from both of the other regions. The assessment of 
the quality of democracy by the Southern Europeans proves to be more variable over time. 
Most importantly, however, it has dramatically decreased since the onset of the Great 
Recession and reached the low level of CEE countries by 2013. 
The second part of Figure 2 presents the corresponding development of trust in the European 
Parliament (EP). As we can see from this figure, trust in the EP has been higher in SE and 
CEE countries than in NWE before the crisis. As a reaction to the crisis, trust in the EP 
decreased in all three regions, but while the decline remained limited in NWE and CEE, it 
took on dramatic proportions in SE. Only towards the end of 2014, after the most recent 
European elections, trust in the EP started to pick up again across Europe.  
To be sure, there are country-specific variations within each one of the regions – variations I 
cannot go into here for lack of space. The key point is that in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession the dramatic disenchantment with both their national politics and with European 
politics sets the Southern Europeans apart. They are not only very pessimistic about the state 
of their national economy. In the aftermath of the Great Recession, they have also become 
disillusioned politically, with respect to both domestic and European politics. Slovenia is the 
only other country that is characterized by a similar pattern of precipitous double disen-
chantment. In SE, we currently witness a combination of an economic with an acute political 
crisis. Northwestern Europeans, by contrast, remain satisfied with their national politics and, 
while they have lost some confidence in European politics, a majority of them still trusts the 
European institutions. In CEE, finally, people have already been disenchanted with their 
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domestic politics long before the Great Recession, but majorities of them continue to trust 
European institutions, even if these majorities have become smaller.  
 
Implications for the politicization of European integration 
As we have just seen in the last section, the NWE countries have rather rapidly recovered 
from the economic crisis and their public still supports the EU to a large, although somewhat 
reduced extent.  Against this background, rather than a reaction to the Great Recession, the 
continuing rise of Euroscepticism in NWE is likely to be part of a long-term rise of the New 
Right, which dates at least as far back as the early 1980s, when the French Front National 
achieved its first electoral success. Although the recent spectacular score of this party in the 
2014 EP elections constitutes its so far greatest electoral achievement, it only marks the latest 
step in a long-term development that is characteristic of the transformation of the national 
party systems in NWE in general. The series of recent breakthroughs of UKIP, the Sweden 
Democrats, the True Finns and the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), while being 
spectacular in a short-term perspective, is nothing but an expression of the fact that the 
corresponding party systems are belatedly catching up with the general long-term trend. 
Particularly inhospitable institutional (UK) and structural conditions (Sweden and Finland) as 
well as adverse political legacies (Germany) have previously prevented the rise of such 
parties in these countries. According to this interpretation, their success should not be 
attributed to the more recent crises in the European integration process, but to the general 
conflict between universalism and particularism, which has been articulated by the New Left 
and the New Right and of which the European integration process is an important part. If this 
interpretation is correct, we may expect the current refugees’ crisis to provide additional fuel 
for the rise of Eurosceptics in this part of Europe, because it directly plays into the hands of 
the anti-immigration position of the parties from the New Right in NWE. 
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By contrast, the euro crisis in combination with the national political crisis has served as the 
catalyst for the rise of the New Left and a specific type of Euroscepticism in SE. To 
understand this development, it is important to keep in mind that in SE the crisis has been a 
combination of an economic and a political crisis that has given rise to two overlapping 
conflicts (an economic and a political one) with two targets (a domestic and a European one). 
The economic conflict has been about austerity, while the political conflict has been about 
corruption and democracy. The main target of both conflicts has arguably been the domestic 
elites. The salience of European targets, by contrast, has varied from one country to the other: 
while European targets have been crucial in Greece, their importance has been much more 
limited in the other SE countries (Hutter et al., 2016a). In all of these countries, however, the 
conflict with the established domestic elites drove the rise of new challengers.  
In SE, the compromised historical legacy of the radical right and the extent of economic 
hardship have favored new challengers from the left, i.e. challengers who call for national 
and European social solidarity. Tellingly, however, the beneficiaries on the left were not from 
the ‘old’, communist left, but from the ‘new’ left: Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, M5S 
in Italy, and Bloco de Esquerda in Portugal. What these parties have in common is their 
opposition to the established national elites. In the Spanish case, we need to add Ciudadanos, 
a party that is best compared to parties like D’66 in the Netherlands, left-liberals who 
mobilize for the renewal of politics while at the same time supporting an economically liberal 
program (Rodriguez-Teruel and Barrio, 2015, p. 10). As recent electoral analyses show 
(Vidal-Lorda, 2016), both Podemos and Ciudadanos have mainly been chosen for their 
challenge to the established political elites.  
Except for Ciudadanos, these parties also oppose the austerity policies that have been 
imposed by domestic and European elites. Contrary to the principled Euroscepticism of the 
old Communist left in SE, however, the Euroscepticism of this New Left is not incompatible 
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with EU and euro membership (e.g. Altiparmakis, 2016). What these parties desire is a 
different, more social Europe that is solidary with the predicament of the populations in the 
South – a predicament for which they blame both their domestic and European elites. 
Arguably, Syriza is the paradigmatic case of this New Left. It has forcefully mobilized 
against both, domestic and European elites: Alexis Tsipras, Syriza’s leader, used the phrase 
‘external troika – internal troika’, where the three-party coalition government (ND, PASOK 
and DIMAR) was effectively equated with the country’s emergency lenders (EC, ECB and 
IMF). Syriza’s double goal was to overthrow two-partyism and austerity policies (Stavrakakis 
and Katsambekis, 2014).4 Originally a splinter from the Greek communist party, Syriza 
remained in the shadow of the ‘old’ left for quite some time, but definitely shed its 
communist legacy with the schism that led to the departure of its remaining old-left 
components in the run-up to the autumn 2015 elections. Typical for a party of the New Left, 
Syriza is ‘one of the most consistent advocates of the immigrants’ equal rights and their full 
inclusion in Greek society’ (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014, p. 132). By contrast, the 
Italian M5S at first sight seems to fit least into the New Left category, as many of its 
supporters have defected from the right. But this challenger, too, has a number of features in 
common with the new social movements and the parties they spawned: as Biorcio (2014, p. 
37) has observed, in many ways, this movement recalls the German Greens thirty years ago.  
As the German and other new social movements in the late sixties and early seventies, M5S 
criticizes representative democracy, the established political elites (la ‘casta’) and the 
established media in the name of direct and deliberative democracy (to be practiced through 
the Internet).  
Finally, the euro crisis has not had much of an impact on CEE countries, because they were 
either less affected economically or recovered rather quickly, and probably also because their 
                                                          
4 See Featherstone’s contribution to this volume.  
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population had a higher pain threshold (Coffey, 2013). As a matter of fact, several of these 
countries (Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014), Lithuania (2014)) were happy to 
join the Eurozone in the midst of the euro crisis. Politicians in these net-recipient states tend 
to see the EU as a ‘cash cow to be milked’ (Haughton and Rybar 2009). The domestic 
political crisis, by contrast, significantly influenced the more recent electoral outcomes 
(Hernandez and Kriesi, 2015), confirming Haughton’s (2014, p. 80) observation that ‘[a]nti-
corruption and a general feeling that the existing political elites are incompetent is a 
particularly potent theme in the contemporary politics of CEE.’  
However, to the extent that the EU is no longer part of the solution to the problems of its CEE 
Member States, but rather becomes perceived as a source of problems, Euroscepticism may 
also increase in CEE countries. Rising Euroscepticism in CEE is expected to be an expression 
of the defensive nationalism which is characteristic for this region. While opposition to 
Europe in SE is above all economically motivated, it is likely to be above all culturally 
motivated in the East. Accordingly, and in contrast to the euro crisis, the refugees’ crisis is 
likely to fuel Euroscepticism on the basis of the defensive nationalism. Thus, in tune with the 
general style of Hungarian party politics, which emphasizes cultural issues, Orbán’s Fidesz is 
exploiting this crisis for its own purposes, in line with its earlier strategy of re-aligning the 
political field and re-profiling its own electorate on the right of the political spectrum 
(Enyedi, 2005). Similarly, Kaczińsky’s PiS is exploiting this crisis, with a decidedly religious 
bent: for PiS, the refugees’ issue is about protecting Poland’s culture, tradition and heritage 
from a perceived external, non-Christian threat. The refugees’ crisis also lends itself to the 
organization of cross-national coordinated efforts of defensive reactions: in February 2016, 
Hungary and Poland were joined by Slovakia and the Czech Republic, the other two partners 
of the so-called Visegrad group, to discuss border protection against refugees. To the extent 
that the defensive nationalism becomes the defining feature of the East Europeans’ 
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Euroscepticism, it brings them closer to the situation in NWE, i.e. to a Euroscepticism driven 
by the New Right. 
 
Conclusion 
In the tough intergovernmental bargaining processes during the euro crisis, the European 
governments represented their national interest as ‘debtor’ or ‘creditor’ nations – whatever 
their partisan composition. Given the importance of intergovernmental crisis management, 
the public debate on the euro crisis has been dominated by supranational executive agencies 
and national executives. Most importantly, this debate has led to the dominant role of the 
German executive not only in the German debate, but also in the debate in the other countries 
(Kriesi and Grande, 2016), a process that has been replicated in the refugees’ crisis.  
As a result of this development the divergence of the positions on European integration 
among Member States has been accentuated. However, divergence between Member States 
in this respect is nothing new. In our analysis of the European integration debate we have 
uncovered a stable configuration of four actor clusters that has been characterizing the 
European integration process ever since the seventies (Maag and Kriesi, 2016). This 
configuration reproduces the antagonism between Europeanists and Eurosceptics at the 
Europe-wide level, but adds considerable detail with respect to the predominant Europeanist 
camp. In fact, this camp turns out to be divided into (at least) three clusters, based on the 
different views of European integration among executive actors in the multilevel governance 
structure. First, there are the ‘integrationists’ (the supranational actors and their national 
allies, with the German government the most important among them), who fully endorse the 
integration process as it has been shaping up over recent decades. They face the ‘protec-
tionists’ (the French and Italian governments and their allies), who support the integrationists 
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but are more sceptical about economic liberalisation, and the neoliberal ‘minimalists’ (the 
British government and its allies), who, on the contrary, endorse market liberalisation and 
enlargement but consistently reject any other kind of integration. The important point is that 
the major structuring conflicts at the European level are those between governments 
representing their national interests, and not those opposing parties which represent the 
interests of social groups that cut across national borders.  
The structuring of conflicts at the European level is, however, connected to the structuring of 
partisan conflicts at the national level, given that the composition of the national governments 
which represent the Member States in the intergovernmental governance structures is 
determined by the outcome of the national elections. One of the most important findings of 
Hutter et al.’s (2016) study is that the two kinds of structuring conflicts – the intergovern-
mental conflict between different visions of European integration, and the inter-partisan 
conflict between pro-Europeanists and Eurosceptics at the domestic level – feed into each 
other. Therefore, to the extent that the Eurosceptics gain in electoral weight at the national 
level their influence will also make itself increasingly felt at the intergovernmental level.  
To the extent that it will no longer be possible to keep them out of governing coalitions, the 
Eurosceptics will introduce national resistance into supranational governance, while the 
conflicts between the Member States that become visible in the intergovernmental crisis 
management are likely to feed back into national politics where they pitch pro-Europeans 
against Eurosceptics. Already, Eurosceptics from the populist right in NWE have become 
part of governing coalitions in Austria (FPÖ), Finland (True Finns), Norway (People’s Party), 
or have supported minority centre-right governments from the outside in the Netherlands 
(PVV) and in Denmark (DPP). In other NWE countries, the dominant governing party has 
had to deal with internal Eurosceptic opposition, most notably the British Conservatives 
(divided by the ‘Brexit’ referendum), the German CDU-CSU (under pressure both in the euro 
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and the refugees’ crisis), and the French Socialist Party (torn apart by major treaty reforms 
causing anxieties about a ‘neoliberal’ Europe). In SE, Eurosceptics from the populist right 
have been in government in Italy for quite some time (Lega Nord), while the New Left 
Eurosceptics from Syriza have become the dominant governing party in 2015. In CEE, 
Eurosceptics like Fidesz or PiS currently dominate their governments.  
Finally, to the extent that the Eurosceptics increasingly become part of the governing 
coalitions in the different regions of Europe, they are likely to become mainstream parties 
themselves. They can be expected to introduce their regionally different visions of Europe 
into the intergovernmental process – visions reaffirming the sovereignty of the Member 
States in NWE and CEE contrasting with visions insisting on European-wide solidarity in SE. 
With the expected ‘mainstreaming’ of Eurosceptic parties, the politicization of the European 
integration process is likely to shift from the debate between principled support (defended by 
the ‘old’ mainstream parties) and principled opposition (defended by the ‘old’ Eurosceptics) 
to the conflict with respect to the kind of European Union that we Europeans wish to 
construct – essentially the choice between a minimalist, neoliberal union of sovereign nation-
states (defended by the ‘mainstreamed’ New Right) and an ever closer, solidary union of an 
as yet still to be defined institutional architecture (defended by the ‘mainstreamed’ New 
Left). 
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Table 1: Vote shares of left and right Eurosceptic parties from the three regions of Europe in 
the 2014 EP elections: percentages 
region left   right   n 
  
Hobolt 
(2014) 
 
Hernandez/ 
Kriesi 
(2016) 
Hobolt 
(2014) 
 
Hernandez/ 
Kriesi 
(2016)   
Northwest 5.6 4.0 17.4 14.7 11 
South 17.1 17.3 7.6 4.1 6 
Central-East 2.0 1.1 21.4 13.8 10 
CEE (without HU/PL) 2.5 1.4 13.2 3.6 8 
Average 6.8 5.9 16.7 12.0 27 
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Figure 1:  Assessment of current national economy (share of citizens assessing the state of 
the national economy as rather/very good), by region 
 
The vertical line indicates the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 
Source: Eurobarometer, on average two measures (spring and fall) per year 
 
  
32 
 
Figure 2: Assessment of the quality of democracy/of the EP by region 
a) Satisfaction with the way democracy works at the domestic level (share of fairly and very 
satisfied citizens) 
 
b) Trust in the European Parliament: share of the trusting citizens (share of citizens who trust 
the EP) 
 
The vertical line indicates the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 
Source: Eurobarometer, on average two measures (spring and fall) per year 
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